This paper uses differential timing across counties of the removal of restrictions on Sunday alcohol sales in the state of Georgia to determine whether the change had an impact on employment and hours in the beer, wine, and liquor retail sales industry. A triple-difference (DDD) analysis finds significant relative increases in average weekly hours in the treated industry. There is no significant relative employment increase. The DDD hours result is stronger when we limit the counties removing restrictions to those that border states with significantly higher alcohol excise taxes.
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Impact of Allowing Sunday Alcohol Sales in Georgia on Employment and Hours
Introduction and Background
Different counties and municipalities in Georgia started allowing sales of alcohol on Sundays as early as November 13, 2011. Laws prohibiting the sale of alcohol on Sundays are commonly referred as "blue laws" and have existed in the United States since colonial times.
When Prohibition was repealed in 1933, several states, including Georgia, opted to retain Sunday sales restrictions. During the 2011 legislative session, Georgia legislators voted to allow counties and cities to determine whether grocery, convenience, and liquor stores could sell alcohol on Sundays. As of the 4th quarter of 2013, 53 unincorporated counties (33.3%) and 174 cities (33.9%) had held referendums in order to allow alcohol sales on Sunday. At the time the bill was passed, Georgia was only one of three remaining states in the U.S. with blue laws on the books (Indiana and Connecticut were the other two).
In the debate surrounding the pros and cons for blue laws, discussion of traffic accidents and the potential boon to state coffers seemed to be just as important as any moral or biblical concerns (for example, see Bonner 2011; Jenkins 2011; Guntzel 2011 ; AP Reports 2011), although one study found a 15 percent decline in church attendance in states where blue laws have been repealed (Gruber and Hungerman 2008) . In addition, a 2012 report by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Weir 2012) reviewed the literature relating traffic accidents, domestic disturbances, and outdoor assaults to restrictions of Sunday alcohol sales: traffic fatalities increased when restriction were removed (also see McMillan and Lapham 2006) and domestic disturbances and outdoor assaults declined when restrictions were enacted. Evidence that repealing blue laws does not increase traffic fatalities (except in New Mexico) is found in Lovenheim and Steefel (2011) , Maloney and Rudbeck (2009) , and Stehr (2010) .
2 This paper deviates from the concerns about traffic fatalities, state revenues, and salvation to focus on the labor market impact of the repeal of the Sunday alcohol sales restrictions in the state of Georgia. We make use of administrative data that the Georgia Department of Labor uses to administer the state's Unemployment Insurance Program. These data are historically referred to as ES202 data and are the data used to produce the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). The advantage of using the actual administrative data is that this analysis is not constrained by data suppression rules imposed on the public version of the QCEW. We are able to take advantage of the differential timing of implementation across counties and municipalities to perform a tripledifference type of analysis of changes in employment and weekly earnings in NAICS (North American Industry Classification System) code 4453 (beer, wine, & liquor stores), relative to employment and weekly earnings changes in other industries, in counties that passed a sales referendum compared to those changes in counties that did not pass a referendum. Since there is no reason to expect this law change would affect hourly wages of liquor store sales clerks and stockers, the weekly earnings analysis can tell us something about changes in relative hours of those workers.
It is possible that extending the window of opportunity to purchase alcohol will increase alcohol sales, thus increase demand for workers and/or workers' hours to tend stores to meet this greater demand. On the other hand, allowing sales on Sunday may merely shift alcohol purchases from another day of the week to Sunday, not raising total sales, or labor demand in this industry at all. There is some evidence for this latter possibility from Carpenter and Eisenberg (2009) who find that while the expansion of alcohol sales to Sunday (in Canada) significantly increased the amount of drinking on Sunday, it did not increase overall total alcohol 3 consumption (also see Bernheim, Meer, and Novarro 2012) . We do not have consumption data to be able to distinguish increases or shifts in consumption across days. However, unless liquor store owners merely shift their day of closure in response to the removal of sales restrictions on Sundays, an extra day of business will require additional staff, even if total consumption does not increase.
Additionally, consumers may not only shift consumption from one day of the week to another, they may also shift their point of purchase even on weekdays and Saturdays. If consumers transfer some of their purchases, say, on Saturday, from liquor stores in counties not removing restrictions to any day from stores in county removing restrictions, we may also see declines in employment or hours in stores located in counties where restrictions remain. We find some evidence of this behavior through larger declines in average hours in counties where sales restrictions remained. The net result is relatively higher average weekly hours in the beer, wine, & liquor store industry relative to other non-retail industries, after restrictions are removed, relative to before, and in counties that removed restrictions, relative to those that did not. We don't find any relative adjustments in employment levels.
The analysis in this paper contributes to our knowledge about the potential labor market impact of a policy (specifically, the removal of restriction on alcohol sales) that is neither motivated by nor directly targeted to the labor market. In addition, we contribute to the existing evidence of the importance of "border" effects -consumers respond to geographic differences in restrictions and prices (or taxes) by shifting consumption patterns to take advantage of those differences. 4
The Data
Georgia Department of Labor Employment and Wage Data (ES202)
For the purposes of administering its Unemployment Insurance program, each state requires employers to file a quarterly report with the state Department of Labor detailing all wages paid to workers who are covered under the Social Security Act of 1935. These data provide an almost complete census of firms in the state, covering approximately 99.7 percent of all wage and salary workers (Committee on Ways and Means 2004) . The firm-level information identifies the firm's county, six digit NAICS, number of employees, and total wage bill for each quarter. These data are historically referred to as ES202 data and provide the foundation for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which is publicly available. 1 Ideally, one would be able to analyze changes in employment and hours at the firm level, however only aggregated data at the industry/county level for each quarter has been made available to us. Nonetheless, the administrative ES202 data do offer a significant advantage over the publically available QCEW data since they are not subject to the data suppression rules imposed by the BLS for release of the QCEW. 2
The focus of this paper is employment and hours in the beer, wine, & liquor stores (NAICS=4453) retail industry. This is the industry we would expect to be most affected by the removal of restrictions on Sunday alcohol sales, hence this is the treated industry. All other nonretail industries will be used as the control --those not expected to be affected by the Sunday sales referendums. Other (non-liquor store) retail will be used for falsification tests (see Even 1 Adams and Cotti (2007) is another example of using QCEW to measure the effect of a policy (smoking bans) on employment across counties with differential restrictions. 2 We would be subject to those suppression rules if we wanted to report county/industry details of employment and wages, but the unsuppressed data can be used without restriction for regression analysis. and Macpherson 2014). NAICS industries 4451 (grocery stores), 4452 (specialty food stores), 4471 (gasoline stations), 4529 (other general merchandise stores), 1029 and 9999 (not otherwise classified) are excluded from all analyses to make the distinction between treated and control industries as clean as possible --4451, 4452, 4471, and 4529 correspond to retail establishments that may or may not sell alcohol and are likely to have already been open on Sundays.
While employers are not required to report average weekly hours of their workers, they do report total quarterly earnings from which we construct average weekly earnings by diving by the total number of workers and then by 13 (the number of weeks in a quarter); this is how the BLS constructs their estimate of average weekly earnings by industry that they report in the QCEW. Since evidence suggests that the hourly pay of workers in the beer, wine, & liquor store industry did not rise over this time period (evidence provided below), we interpret any significant relative changes in average weekly earnings as significant relative changes in average weekly hours.
Data from the Georgia Food Industry Association
The dates on which different counties and municipalities held referendums on the sale of alcohol on Sunday were obtained from the Georgia Food Industry Association (GFIA). The data provided by the GFIA include information for all 159 counties and 513 cities in the state of Georgia. The data contain information on whether a referendum was held (or not), the outcome (passed/failed with actual vote count), and, if passed, the effective date (when sales could begin).
County geography provides another dimension across which the analysis is performed. For example, while we would expect industry 4453 to be most affected by the removal of sales restriction, we would not expect liquor stores in counties that did not pass the referendum to be affected, only those located in counties that removed the sales restrictions.
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Data from OnTheMap
Since we only have county level industry employment and earnings data available to us, we need to establish whether a particular county allowed alcohol sales and when sales began.
However, since each county and city could hold separate referendums, it is not uncommon for the vote in the unincorporated part of the county to have gone one way and the vote in one or more cities within the county to have gone the other way. Note that a county vote only covers establishments within the unincorporated area of the county --the vote does not apply to cities within the county; they have to hold their own, separate referendum. In order to make a determination of whether a particular county should be considered a "pass" county (allowing Sunday alcohol sales) or a "non-pass" county (not allowing sales), we use the following rules (see Figure 1 for an illustration): a) For a county that did not hold the referendum or failed to pass the referendum where all the cities within the county never held or passed the referendum, it is classified as a non-pass county. b) For a county that passed the referendum where all the cities within the county also passed the referendum, it is classified as a pass county. The effective date of the referendum for the county is assigned by determining which effective date (among county and municipality effective dates, if different), ordered chronologically, covered at least 50 percent of total employment within the county. 3 We made use of the U.S. Census Bureau online tool 7 OnTheMap.com (http://onthemap.ces.census.gov/) to collect 2011 employment levels for all municipalities and counties. c) For a county that did not hold or pass the referendum that contains some cities that did pass the referendum, or for a county that passed the referendum but contains some cities that did not hold or pass the referendum, we also have to compare employment within those cities to make a county-wide determination. If the cities that conflict with the county vote contain at least 50 percent of the county's employment, then determination is based on the city outcomes, with an effective date (if different across cities) being determined as described above. And, vice versa if the total employment of the conflicting cities does not add up to at least 50 percent of total county employment. 4
[ Figure 1 about here] Finally, we end up coding 93 non-pass counties that either never held or failed to pass the referendum, and 66 pass counties, with effective dates between 2011Q4 to 2013Q1, 2013Q4 and 2014Q1. Figure 2 shows a map of Georgia with each county shaded based on the year in which the county is classified as having removed alcohol sales restrictions.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Alternative strategies for classifying counties as having removed or not removed sales restrictions were considered and rejected. For example, one could classify a county as removing restrictions if any entity (any city, no matter how small, or the unincorporated portion of the county) removed sales restrictions. This would be a very weak classification scheme.
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Alternatively, one could require that all entities (all cities plus the unincorporated portion of the county) pass referendums before classifying the county as having removed sales. This would be an excessively stringent classification scheme. Nonetheless, we provide results showing that our results are robust to the weak, but not the stringent, classification scheme.
Sample Means
Table 1 contains sample means by treated industry (beer, wine, & liquor stores), pass/non-pass county (whether the county removed sales restrictions or not), and pre/post time period (before and after the referendum became effective). Control industry includes the averages across all non-retail industries. A number of observations stand out differentiating these different treatment and control groups. Counties that removed Sunday sales restrictions are considerably larger than counties that did not. This can be seen in the large average industry employment both in beer, wine, & liquor stores and in all other industries in pass counties relative to non-pass counties. The lower unemployment rates, higher labor force participation rates, and higher average weekly earnings in counties removing Sunday sales restrictions also suggests a more urban environment, hence greater population. The other differences in characteristics (e.g., percent black or Hispanic) also likely reflect differences in county population sizes and urbanization. Overall, employment in the beer, wine, & liquor retail store industry accounts for approximately 0.1 percent of all employment in Georgia, so the impact on the state economy, even if found to be significant for the industry, would be expected to be quite limited.
[ Table 1 about here]
Methodology
The analysis is structured as a straight-forward triple-difference (DDD) model: (1) all industries are included in the analysis, with the treated industry being beer, wine & liquor retail stores (NAICS 4453); 5 (2) all counties are included in the analysis, those that did pass the sales referendum, and those that did not; and (3) there are both pre-and post-effective date observations for all industries and counties. 6 Hence, the triple-difference structure. All non-retail industries comprise the control "industry."
The basic estimating equation for log employment takes the following form (analysis of log average weekly earnings is analogous): 7
where !"# is log average monthly employment in industry i in county c in quarter t; ! is equal to one if industry i is beer, wine, & liquor retail stores (NAICS=4453); ! is equal to one if county c passed the referendum on Sunday sales of alcohol between 2011Q4 (the earliest possible quarter) and 2013Q4 (the end our data); 8 and !" is set equal to one in the first effective quarter t of the referendum in county c and every quarter thereafter. For counties that did not remove sales restrictions, !" is set equal to one in 2011Q4 (and thereafter); this is the 10 first possible date for Sunday sales to be effective in any county. This post-period designation for non-pass counties in the case of varying effective, or treatment, dates follows the standard practice for difference analyses in which the post-treatment time period varies by observation (for example, see Bellou and Bhatt 2013). Since the dependent variables reflect county/industry averages, the regression is weighted by the number of establishments in the county/industry with positive employment.
We constrain the analysis to include two years of pre-treatment observations for each industry, in order to balance with the post-treatment time period and to avoid including any of the Great Recession period in our analysis. Additional average county characteristics, !" , in time t might help explain the county's demand for alcohol, thus employment or hours, in beer, wine, & liquor stores. These characteristics include the race and age composition in the county, population density, as well as the unemployment and labor force participation rates. 9 County ( ! ), industry ( ! ), and time ( ! ) fixed effects are also included, and the standard errors are clustered at both the industry and county level. The importance of accounting for correlation across industries and counties in the standard errors and controlling for time-and unit-specific fixed effects are highlighted in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Dachis, Duranton, and Turner (2011) , and illustrated in Hotchkiss, Moore, and Rios-Avila (2015) (also see Cameron and Miller 2015) .
A fundamental assumption/requirement for validity of any difference-in-differences (or triple-difference) analysis is that the treatment and control groups have the same trend in the outcome variable prior to treatment (Angrist and Pischke 2008, chap. 5) . In our case, this means Figure 3 suggests that there was some change that coincided with the removal of alcohol sales restrictions that boosted employment growth in all industries in those counties more likely to remove sales restrictions --a group of counties dominated by the Atlanta MSA (see Figure 2 ). Whatever that event was, it appears to have confounded any employment effect impacting the small industry of retail liquor stores. These figures also illustrate the value of being able to difference outcomes among multiple dimensions (i.e., being able to perform a triple-versus merely a doubledifference).
Turning now to interest (i.e., employment or weekly earnings) between treated and control industries from before to after the referendum dates in counties that removed sales restrictions, relative to the percentage change in employment or earnings between treated and control industries in counties that did not remove restrictions.
Results
DDD Regression Results for Employment and Weekly Earnings
[ Table 2 about here]
Columns 1 and 2 report the triple-difference estimation results. First of all, very few of the county-specific demographic and economic regressors contribute explanatory power for either employment or earnings. This is not surprising given the county, industry, and time fixed effects that are also included. The coefficient estimate on the × × regressor indicates no statistically significant relative impact from the removal of Sunday alcohol sales on employment (column 1) in the beer, wine, & liquor store retail industries in those counties passing a referendum, relative to other non-retail industries in counties not passing a referendum.
This result is not unexpected given what is shown in Figure 3 --we don't find evidence of higher employment in the beer, wine, & liquor stores, post-referendum, in the counties that passed the referendum, relative to counties that did not.
However, average weekly earnings (column 2) in the treated industry is 10.5 percent higher post-referendum than pre-referendum in counties that passed a referendum, compared to counties that did not pass the referendum, relative to the same comparison for weekly earnings in all other non-retail industries. It's important to stress the use of the word "relative" in assessing this triple-difference result here since it appears in Figure 4 that average weekly earnings fell in both pass and non-pass counties. This is confirmed by the double-difference results reported in columns (3)-(6) of Table 2 .
A Peek inside the DDD Black Box for Average Weekly Earnings
The triple-difference marginal effect estimates give us the net impact of removing Sunday sales restrictions across three dimensions. To peer into the triple-difference "black box,"
we can look at the double-difference estimation results for log weekly earnings reported in columns (3) through (6) of Table 2 . 10 The significant positive coefficient on ! !" within the treated industry in column (3) indicates that, within the beer, wine, & liquor store industry, average weekly earnings are higher post referendums versus pre-, in pass counties relative to in non-pass counties (also see Figure 4 , panel a). The insignificant coefficient in column (4) on ! !" within the control industry tells us there is no significant difference in relative average log weekly earnings across county types pre-versus post-referendum (also see Figure 4 ,
The coefficients on ! !" in columns (5) and (6) (also see Figure 4 , panels c and d) tell us that average weekly wages in beer, wine, & liquor stores were lower post referendum, relative to wages in non-retail industries, in both pass and non-pass counties, but more so in nonpass counties. So the positive triple-difference result for average weekly earnings is supported both along the pass/non-pass and treat/control dimensions, however it is clearly being driven by a greater decline in weakly earnings in beer, wine, & liquor stores in non-pass counties.
Interpreting the Impact on Weekly Earnings as Impact on Weekly Hours
Evidence from the BLS Occupational Employment Statistics shows that real hourly pay of cashiers in liquor stores nationally (or in Georgia) did not rise any faster over the sample time period than real hourly pay of all cashiers (see Figure 5 ). 11 Therefore, we interpret the relative 15 rise in real weekly earnings as a relative increase in hours per week among workers in the beer, wine, & liquor store retail industry.
[ Figure 5 about here]
The average weekly hours among non-supervisory employees in the beer, wine, & liquor store industry in 2011 was about 26 hours per week and the real hourly wage was flat over the study period. Therefore, a relative increase of 10.5 percent in average weekly earnings means, compared to workers in other non-retail industries, workers in beer, wine, & liquor stores in counties that removed sales restrictions were working about three hours more per week after the removal of restrictions than before, relative to the hours change of workers in liquor stores located in counties not removing restrictions. 12 As mentioned earlier, additional sales of alcohol on Sunday may very well derive from not only shifts in purchases from another day of the week to Sunday, but also from a shift in purchases from liquor stores in non-pass counties to liquor stores in counties that removed restrictions. Liquor stores in pass counties then add shifts (or, rather, don't cut them as much) to their current work schedule, whereas liquor stores in non-pass counties cut shifts (more) since not as many workers are needed the rest of days of the week. Table 3 contains a variety of checks on the robustness of the log weekly earnings tripledifference results. The baseline marginal effect (10.5 percent relative increase) from Table 2 is repeated in the first row of Table 3 for ease of comparison. The next two rows provide the marginal effects for the baseline specification when no weights are applied to the analysis and when other retail is used as the control industry (as opposed to all other non-retail). The next modification (3) allows for baseline trend differences between the control and treated industries, 16 by simply interacting the trend fixed effect with the treated dummy variable. We do this to test whether the estimated effect simply derives from differences in underlying trends in the treatment and control industries. All three modifications for baseline specification consistently provide a significantly relative increase of 9.8 percent to 13.2 percent.
Robustness of and Falsification Test for Weekly Earnings Results
[ Table 3 about here]
Modification (4) to their geographic location, as will be seen in the next set of robustness tests.
If the positive impact from removing sales restrictions is to be interpreted as more Sunday alcohol sales in those counties that removed restrictions, then one might expect to see a greater relative impact in pass counties that share a border with a non-pass county. This is often referred to as a border effect, which has been used to investigate the impact of differential geographic policies on anything from location of manufacturing plants (Holmes 1998) , to crop yields (Edwards and Howe 2015) , house prices (Black 1999) , cigarette consumption (Goolsbee, Lovenheim, and Slemrod 2010) , restaurant patronage (Adams and Cotti 2007) , and most relevant to the current analysis, alcohol purchases (Stehr 2010) . Not only is a county that removed sales restrictions now able to sell to its own residents on Sunday, but it is also likely that consumers from nearby counties that still have restrictions in place will travel to make a purchase on Sunday. We would therefore expect to see a larger impact when only pass counties that border non-pass counties are included in the analysis. Doing this surprisingly produces a marginally smaller impact. However, if we restrict the analysis to only counties (pass and nonpass) outside the Atlanta MSA, where the opportunities for cross-border purchases are more abundant, the impact is back up to the baseline. The implication, then, is that not all borders are created equal. When a pass county has to share a non-pass county's border with other pass counties, any cross-border advantage appears to be diluted.
Furthermore, if we include only pass counties that are located on the state border, the impact is even larger than the baseline. Sixteen pass counties border Alabama, Tennessee, Florida, and South Carolina. 13 Additionally, Georgia has the lowest alcohol tax of all the surrounding states. In 2011 Georgia's state excise tax rate on spirits was $3.79/gallon. The tax rates in surrounding state were $18.61 Alabama, $4.46 in Tennessee, $5.42 in South Carolina, and $6.50 in Florida (see http://taxfoundation.org/article/state-excise-tax-rates-spirits-2007-2013). Stehr (2010) found a significant impact of differences in alcohol taxes on cross-state purchases, and with the potential of additional cross-state sales on Sunday, it's likely these border counties in Georgia extended their Sunday hours as much as possible (or didn't reduce them as much) relative to non-pass counties in Georgia.
Evidence that cross-border purchases are important can also be seen if we restrict the analysis to include only counties (pass and non-pass) in the Atlanta MSA. All but a very few counties ended up removing Sunday sales restrictions. The result is that there are only opportunities for sales to shift across days but not across counties, producing a statistically insignificant affect on hours. While employers may add a Sunday shift to the work schedule, if sales are shifting to Sunday from other days of the week, it means the store doesn't need as many worker hours the rest of the week, so it turns out to be a wash from a worker's perspective. This analysis restricted to the Atlanta MSA also provides an insight as to what impact we would likely 13 All counties bordering North Carolina are non-pass counties.
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have found if all counties had removed sales restriction --no effect on either employment or hours.
The next set of results in Table 3 report the estimated impact of removing sales restrictions under different classification schemes that determine whether counties are considered to have removed restrictions or not. In one version, we considered a county to have passed a referendum only if all entities (all cities and unincorporated county) in that county removed sales restrictions. The triple-difference estimate under this classification is not statistically significant.
This is not surprising since many liquor stores in counties under the "all" restriction may be able to sell alcohol on Sunday, but the county will still be classified as "non-pass" in this specification since not all entities removed restrictions.
The second alternative classification considers a county to have passed the referendum if any entity removed sales restrictions. The significant, but marginally smaller (than the baseline) estimate under the "any" restriction is also expected since a county will be designated as "pass" even if a very small entity removed sales restrictions, therefore still limiting availability. The implication is that our preferred classification scheme (requiring 50 percent of entities in a county to have passed the referendum) is not an unreasonable strategy.
If we are to believe that the positive relative weekly earnings results are directly related to the passage by counties of referendums removing restrictions on alcohol sales, then we should see no impact on the rest of retail over this time period, relative to other non-retail industries, since the rest of retail, although similar in nature to the business of beer, wine, & liquor store retail, should not have been affected by the removal of Sunday sales restrictions. The last result
in Table 3 provides validation from this falsification regression. The insignificant tripledifference coefficient when the rest of retail is falsely classified as the "treated" industry tells us that the positive impact on relative weekly earnings over this time period was unique in the beer, wine, & liquor store industry, which is to be expected since this is the only industry directly impacted by the removal of sales restrictions on Sunday.
Conclusions and Implications
Restricting liquor stores from selling alcohol on Sundays is a holdover from Prohibition.
By the end of 2011, Georgia was only one of three states with these so-called "blue laws" still on the books. After the state legislature voted in 2011 to allow local jurisdictions to decide their own moral and economic fate by allowing alcohol to be sold on Sundays, about one-third of counties and municipalities in Georgia eventually did so by the end of 2013. The analysis in this paper exploits the natural experiment of differential timing across counties of referendums deciding the matter by structuring a triple-difference analysis to determine whether those counties that removed Sunday sales restrictions experienced a relative boost in employment or average weekly hours in the industry most affected --beer, wine, & liquor retail stores --relative to counties that did not remove the restrictions.
Controlling for county and industry fixed effects and time trends, the triple-difference analysis did not reveal any significant relative impact on employment, but did indicate a 10.5 percent higher average weekly earnings in the beer, wine & liquor store industry, postreferendum, relative to other non-retail industries, in counties that removed alcohol sales restrictions, relative to counties that did not; we estimate this translates into about three additional hours of work per week, on average for those workers (relative to workers in the industry in non-pass counties). It's important to emphasize the relativeness of this result, as it appears weekly hours declined in the treated industry in both counties that did and did not remove sales restrictions. Being able to difference the outcome of interest across multiple 20 dimensions (i.e., triple-difference), allows us to uncover the positive relative impact of removing alcohol sales restrictions.
The implication of these results is that even if total alcohol consumption did not increase (as suggested would be the case by Bernheim, Meer, and Novarro 2012; Carpenter and Eisenberg 2009 ), a significant number of liquor store owners in pass counties felt the pressure to stay open an additional day. In addition, the significantly larger decline in average weekly hours in the beer, wine, & liquor store industry in non-pass counties also suggests that consumers were likely shifting their purchases across counties as well as days. The likely gain in cross-border business is most statistically evident in pass counties along the Georgia border with other states that have significantly higher alcohol taxes. These results also suggest that if all counties eventually remove alcohol sales restrictions (mimicked in this paper by restricting the analysis to the Atlanta MSA), then there would be no measured impact on hours --absent an increase in total alcohol sales, employers would add Sunday shifts to work schedules, but not need as many hours worked on other days of the week. Notes: Dependent variables are average log monthly employment and average log weekly earnings in industry i, county c, quarter t. Treated industry is beer, wine, & liquor store retail. Control "industry" is the average among all other non-retail industries. Regression also includes industry, county, and time fixed effects. Observations are weighted by the number of establishments in the county/industry with positive employment. *, **, *** => statistically different from zero at the 90, 95, and 99 percent confidence levels. Standard errors are clustered at both the county and the industry level. Baseline results (see Table 2 
